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I. INTRODUCTION
Melvin Carter, the "College Terrace Rapist," was convicted of twenty-three
felonies and confessed to over 100 rapes on college campuses in the San
Francisco Bay Area, Stockton, and Davis, California.' In 1996, he was set to be
paroled from prison.2 Voters put pressure on former Governor Pete Wilson to
* J.D. candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred 2008; B.A.,
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1. Mareva Brown & Sam Stanton, Special Report: Sexual Predators Evading Treatment, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Feb. 12, 2006, at Al.
2. Id.
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prevent Carter's anticipated parole in 1996.' As a result, state officials sent Carter
to live at a prison camp on U.S. Forest Service land.4 Later he was escorted to the
San Francisco International Airport, placed on a flight leaving California, and no
one would divulge where Carter went.5 The administration narrowly avoided the
release of a dangerous felon back into society. But such drastic measures are not
available in every situation. Thus, the question remained, what would California
do in the future with other predators like Carter, their release dates looming
ominously on the horizon?
The ensuing public uproar demanded a solution that would keep the highest
risk offenders out of society even after they completed their prison sentences.6 In
response to Carter's release and other similar cases, California enacted the
Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). 7 Former Governor Pete Wilson praised
the SVPA, claiming it would curb the release of the "sickest and most dangerous
criminals" back into society.' Unfortunately, as this Comment will discuss, it has
failed to fulfill its promise, and high risk offenders such as Carter could still be
released.
When the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) determines that an incarcerated person may be a sexually
violent predator, that person must be evaluated. 9 The CDCR and the Board of
Prison Terms evaluates whether the inmate committed a sexually violent





7. See Mary Lynne Vellinga, Mentally Ill Sex Criminals Face Longer Lockup, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct.
11, 1995, at A3 (explaining the decision to pass the legislation after thousands protested the release of Reginald
Muldrew, the "'Pillowcase Rapist,"' who was found mentally unfit to be released from prison but was released
upon completion of his sentence and parole period); see also Peter A. Zamoyski, Will California's "One Strike"
Law Stop Sexual Predators, or Is a Civil Commitment System Needed?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1249, 1250-51
(1995) (describing the public demand for California lawmakers to push through "tougher laws to protect society
from repeat offenders, especially violent sex offenders" after Richard Allen Davis, a parolee with prior sex
crime convictions, sexually assaulted and murdered twelve-year-old Polly Klaas).
8. Vellinga, supra note 7.
9. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(a)(l) (West Supp. 2007).
10. See id. § 6600(e) ("'Predatory' means an act [that] is directed toward a stranger, a person of casual
acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship exists, or an individual with whom a relationship has been
established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.").
11. See id. § 6600(b) (defining "sexually violent offenses" as a felony violation of specified California Penal
Code sections "when committed by force, violence, duress, menace, fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on
the victim or another person, or threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person," which
"result[s] in [either] a conviction or a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity"); see also Cal. Dep't of Mental Health,
Frequently Asked Questions, Sept. 7, 2001, http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/Services and Programs/Forensic_
Services/SexOffenderComnitmentProgram/FAQs.asp [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (stating that the specified sex-related crimes "include rape, sodomy, oral copulation, spousal
rape, or lewd or lascivious acts with a child").
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history."' 2 If the inmate is determined "likely to be a sexually violent predator"
based on this evaluation, the CDCR then refers the person for a full evaluation by
the California Department of Mental Health (CDMH).'3
Two CDMH licensed psychiatrists or psychologists assess whether the
inmate "has a diagnosed mental disorder such that he or she is likely to engage in
acts of sexual predatory violence."' 4 If the person is labeled a sexually violent
predator, a petition requesting that the person be committed to a state mental
health facility is filed in superior court.'5 If a superior court finds there is
probable cause that the inmate "is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory
criminal behavior,"'' 6 the judge will order a trial "to determine whether the person
is, by reason of a diagnosed mental disorder, a danger to the health and safety of
others in that the person is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence upon his or
her release."'' 7 If the court or jury determines the person is a sexually violent
predator, that person is committed to a facility designated by the Director of
Mental Health. 
8
As originally enacted, the SVPA required that sexually violent predators be
committed to a mental health facility for a two-year term after their sentences
were completed.' 9 The commitment could only be extended if the court granted a
petition for extension. 0 The inmate was not required to undergo treatment while
committed, 2' and if the inmate received treatment, the treatment did not need to
be "successful" for the person to be released at the end of the two-year
commitment. 2 In fact, an individual could be released without even admitting
that he or she had a problem.23 Further, the SVPA provided for automatic annual
12. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2007).
13. Id.
14. Cal. Dep't of Mental Health, SOCP: Evaluation Program, 2008, http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/
Services and.ProgramsForensicServices/SexOffenderCommitmentProgram/Evaluation.asp (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(d) (West 2006) (requiring the
evaluation to be conducted "by two practicing psychiatrists or psychologists, or one practicing psychiatrist and
one practicing psychologist"). The evaluation includes an "assessment of diagnosable mental disorders, as well
as various factors" associated with the risk of recidivism. Id. § 6601(c). Risk factors that must be considered
"include criminal and psychosexual history, type, degree, and duration of sexual deviance, and severity of
mental disorder." Id.
15. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(i) (West 2006) (stating that the petition will "be filed in the
superior court of the county in which the person was convicted").
16. Id. § 6602.5(a) ("No person may be placed in a state hospital pursuant to the provisions of this article
until there has been a determination ... that there is probable cause to believe that the individual named in the
petition is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.").
17. Id. § 6602(a).
18. Id. § 6604 (amended by Cal. Proposition 83 § 27 (2006)).
19. Id. § 6604.1(a) (West Supp. 2007) (amended by Cal. Proposition 83 (2006)).
20. Id. § 6605(b) (West Supp. 2007) (amended by Cal. Proposition 83 (2006)).
21. See id. § 6606(a) (explaining that those who decline treatment will continue to be offered the
opportunity for treatment on a monthly basis).
22. See id. § 6606(b) ("Treatment does not mean that the treatment [must] be successful or potentially
successful .... ).
23. See id. ("Treatment does not.., mean that the person must recognize his or her problem and
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hearings to determine whether the committed person had changed such that he or
she could be conditionally released 4 Unfortunately, many sexually violent
predators committed to mental health facilities pursuant to the SVPA refused
treatment but were nevertheless released back into society."
In February 2006, the Sacramento Bee printed an expos6 revealing that many
sexually violent predators were released from mental health facilities without
receiving any treatment whatsoever. 6 Within days, California legislators began
27
working to address the problem. Proposition 83, on the November 2006 ballot,
presented California voters with a proposal aimed, in part, at fixing the perceived
shortcomings of the SVPA.2 s California voters approved Proposition 83 by a
landslide.29
Proposition 83, more commonly known as Jessica's Law, 0 increased restric-
tions on releasing sex offenders by lengthening the SVPA's civil commit-ment
term from two years to an indeterminate period." It also provided that a
committed person could seek authorization from the Director of CDMH to
petition the court for conditional or unconditional release. 2 However, the law
allowed sexually violent predators to petition the court for conditional release or
an unconditional discharge "without the recommendation or concurrence of the
Director of Mental Health. 33 Thus, although Jessica's Law increases restrictions
on released sex offenders and requires that committed persons petition before
they can be released, it still contains loopholes through which untreated sexually
willingly participate in the treatment program.").
24. Id. § 6605(b) (West 2006) (amended by Cal. Proposition 83 (2006)).
25. Brown & Stanton, supra note 1.
26. Id.
27. See Sam Stanton, Lawmakers Rush to Close Loopholes in Sex Predator Program, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Feb. 15, 2006, at Al ("Senator Chuck Poochigian, R-Fresno, said ... that he had amended an existing bill
to close loopholes in the program for sexually violent predators that were revealed in a Bee series this week.").
28. See Cal. Proposition 83 § 2(h) (2006) ("[E]xisting laws that provide for the commitment and control
of sexually violent predators must be strengthened and improved.").
29. See Don Thompson, Prosecutors and California Lawyers Narrow Jessica's Law's Reach, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 18, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2006/11/17/state/n 170936S24.DTL
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that Proposition 83 passed with seventy percent voter
support).
30. Denny Walsh, Sexual Predator Law Again Targeted: Capital-Area Man Claims the Restrictions
Violate his Constitutional Rights, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 17, 2006, at A3 ("The measure is called 'Jessica's
Law,' after 9-year-old Jessica Lunsford, who was killed by a convicted sex offender last year in Florida.").
31. Cal. Proposition 83 § 27 (2006) (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604).
32. See Cal. Proposition 83 § 29 (2006) (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6605(b)).
If the Department of Mental Health determines that either: (1) the person's condition has so changed
that the person no longer meets the definition of a sexually violent predator, or (2) conditional
release to a less restrictive alternative is in the best interest of the person and conditions can be
imposed that adequately protect the community, the director shall authorize the person to petition the
court for conditional release... or for an unconditional discharge.
Id.
33. Cal. Proposition 83 (2006) (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6608(a)).
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violent predators may be released back into society.34 To date, at least fifty-four
sexually violent predators have slipped through the loophole in the SVPA
without receiving any treatment.
35
Part II of this Comment argues that although Jessica's Law will likely refuel
constitutional challenges to the SVPA, ultimately, the SVPA remains
constitutionally sound. Part III contends that even as amended by Jessica's Law,
California's SVPA does not further legislative intent and fails to close the
loophole. Finally, Part IV presents alternative solutions to solve the problem.
Whether the California Legislature creates a new outpatient civil commitment
program similar to the program currently used in Texas or statutorily requires
treatment before release, the loophole in California's SVPA must be closed.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CALIFORNIA'S SEXUALLY
VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT
In Hubbart v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court upheld the
SVPA against constitutional attack.3 6 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not
specifically reviewed California's SVPA, the Court has upheld similar statutes.37
Civil commitment statutes, like California's SVPA, are generally upheld as a
valid exercise of state police power.38 Because such statutes involve deprivation
of personal liberty, individuals subject to the statutory provisions are guaranteed
certain constitutional safeguards. 9 Even so, both the California Supreme Court
and the U.S. Supreme Court have held a statute that civilly commits a sexually
violent predator constitutionally sound if the inmate is dangerous and suffers
from a diagnosable medical disorder.4°
35. Brown & Stanton, supra note 1; see infra Part 11.B (explaining that allowing sexually violent
predators to refuse treatment while committed defeats the legislative purpose of the SVPA).
36. See 969 P.2d 584, 611 (Cal. 1999) (holding that California's SVPA was constitutionally sound).
37. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 346 (1997) (holding that the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act did not violate the U.S. Constitution); Hubbart, 969 P.2d 584 (applying Hendricks to find that
California's SVPA was constitutionally sound).
38. See, e.g., People ex rel. Elliott v. Juergens, 95 N.E.2d 602, 605 (I11. 1950) (holding that the state has
the power and duty to protect society from sex criminals who have a continuing propensity to commit sex
crimes after they have completed their penal sentence); People v. Chapman, 4 N.W.2d 18, 28 (Mich. 1942)
(holding that the state statute providing for civil commitment of sexual psychopaths was a valid exercise of the
state's police power in the interest of public safety); State ex reL Sweezer v. Green, 232 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Mo.
1950) (holding valid as an exercise of state police power the restraint of sexual psychopaths predisposed to
continue breaking the law); In re Moulton, 77 A.2d 26, 30 (N.H. 1950) (holding that legislation providing for
the care, treatment, and rehabilitation of sexual psychopaths was within the scope of the state's police power).
39. See, e.g., infra Parts IIA-C (discussing the constitutional safeguards provided for individuals under
the prohibition against passing ex post facto laws, substantive due process guarantees, and double jeopardy
provisions).
40. See, e.g., People v. Levy, 311 P.2d 897, 902 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (holding a statute valid
that provides for the civil commitment of an individual determined to be a sexual psychopath); Hendricks, 521
U.S. at 358 (holding that involuntary civil commitment is not a due process violation as long as the statute
requires more than a mere finding of dangerousness).
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For example, in Kansas v. Hendricks, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Kansas SVPA.4 Similar to California's SVPA, the Kansas
SVPA required a finding of a present "mental abnormality" and evidence of past
sexually violent behavior for a person to be civilly committed as a sexually
42
violent predator. In determining whether Hendricks qualified as a sexually
violent predator, the jury found a "chilling history" of his sexual offenses against
children.43 In addition to the inculpatory testimony of his victims, including his
stepchildren, Hendricks testified that he "repeatedly abused children whenever he
was not confined" and "stated that the only sure way he could keep from sexually
abusing children in the future was 'to die." '4" He admitted that he suffered from
pedophilia and agreed with the state physician's diagnosis "that he [was] not
cured of the condition. ' 45 The trial court determined that pedophilia qualified as a
"mental abnormality" and ordered Hendricks civilly committed as a sexually
violent predator."6 Hendricks appealed on the grounds that the Kansas SVPA
violated his rights under the Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto
47Clauses. The Kansas Supreme Court did not address the double jeopardy and ex
post facto claims but found that the Kansas SVPA violated Hendricks'
substantive due process rights.48
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, upholding the constitutionality of
Kansas's SVPA.4 9 The Court held that the SVPA's definition of "mental
abnormality" satisfied due process0 and that because the SVPA was non-punitive
in nature and in effect, it did not violate double jeopardy and ex post facto
principles." This decision is widely understood to uphold the constitutionality of
state statutes providing for the civil commitment of sexually violent predators for
the purpose of treatment.
Although the SVPA was held constitutional,53 Jessica's Law's recent
amendments have not been examined by the courts. Recent amendments fuel
41. See generally Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (holding, in a five-to-four vote, that Kansas's SVPA did not
violate the Due Process, Double Jeopardy, or Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. Constitution).
42. Id. at 355-56; see also Frequently Asked Questions, supra note II (stating that the Kansas SVPA, as
discussed in Hendricks, is similar to California's SVPA).
43. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 354.
44. Id. at 355.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 355-56.
47. Id. at 356.
48. Id. ("The court then determined that the Act's definition of 'mental abnormality' did not satisfy what
it perceived to be this Court's 'mental illness' requirement in the civil commitment context.").
49. Id. at 360.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 369.
52. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 11 (stating that the case "upheld the
constitutionality of states which provide for the civil commitment of sexually violent predators for treatment
purposes").
53. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 611 (Cal. 1999).
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arguments that the SVPA now violates the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, and
Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Ultimately, the following analysis
demonstrates that the U.S. and California Supreme Courts will likely uphold the
Act's constitutionality.
A. Ex Post Facto Concerns
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution 4 prohibits the passage of
"[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than
the law annexed to the crime, when committed."55 California's SVPA defines a
"sexually violent predator" largely based on past convictions of sexually violent
offenses56 and provides for their civil commitment after the completion of their
sentences.57 For this reason, prior to the enactment of Jessica's Law, the SVPA
was challenged as violating the Ex Post Facto Clause by changing the
consequences of a crime after the crime was committed."
To determine whether the SVPA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, the
threshold inquiry is whether the Act "alter[s] the definition of crimes or
increase[s] the punishment for criminal acts."59 The U.S. Supreme Court has
provided factors for determining what constitutes punishment.60 Accordingly,
most courts consider "holistic factors" that include "the practical effect of the
legislation," legislative intent, "the purpose of the statute, and analogous
historical precedents." 6
Though the SVPA has withstood ex post facto challenges in the past,62
Jessica's Law made the terms of the civil commitment more stringent, which
may renew ex post facto challenges. Specifically, because the SVPA now
imposes an "indeterminate" commitment63 and no longer provides that a person
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
55. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
56. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) (West Supp. 2007) (listing offenses that will lead to being
defined a "'sexually violent predator').
57. See id. § 6601 (West Supp. 2007) (establishing the process for the civil commitment of sexually
violent predators).
58. See, e.g., Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 605 (noting that the petitioner claimed the statutory scheme of the
SVPA violated federal and state Ex Post Facto Clauses "by altering the consequences of criminal behavior after
the fact").
59. See id. (explaining that the basic issue raised by an ex post facto challenge is whether the SVPA
inflicts punishment) (emphasis added).
60. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288 (1996) (describing a two-part test used to determine
what constitutes punishment: (1) whether the proceedings were intended to be criminal or civil, and (2) whether
the proceedings are so punitive as to not be civil).
61. Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425,432 (D. Mass. 1996).
62. See, e.g., Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 611 (holding that SVPA neither "imposes punishment [n]or otherwise
implicates ex post facto concerns").
63. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (amended by Cal. Proposition 83 § 27 (2006)).
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may automatically petition for a less restrictive alternative annually, 64 it may lead
to challenges that the statute's practical effect now constitutes punishment.
California Supreme Court precedent suggests that such a challenge would
likely fail. In Hubbart, a civilly committed inmate challenged the constitu-
tionality of the SVPA on its face and as it was applied to his civil commitment as
a sexually violent predator.65 Hubbart had a long history of "violent, and
66
sometimes bizarre, sex crimes against women" who were strangers to him. His
most recent incarceration was for assaulting a female jogger while out on
parole.67 Both psychologists who were asked to evaluate him found that he was
suffering from "paraphilia," a diagnosable mental disorder, 68 and that he
presented a high risk of committing more sexually violent crimes if released into
society. 69 As a result, he was labeled a sexually violent predator. °
Hubbart challenged the constitutionality of California's SVPA.7" He argued,
inter alia, that the SVPA violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of both the federal
and state constitutions because "the SVPA postpones the release from
confinement of individuals who are incarcerated at the time commitment
proceedings begin," and it allows "the commitment determination to be based on
sexually violent offenses 'committed ... before [its] effective date.' 72 The
California Supreme Court, however, rejected those arguments and, quoting
Hendricks, noted that the duration of the civil commitment was "linked to the
stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person until his mental
abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others."73 Thus, the SVPA was
not punitive in effect and not a violation of ex post facto principles.74
As a result, the California Supreme Court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's
rationale in Hendricks and concluded that "restrict[ing] the freedom of the
dangerously mentally ill [individuals] ... is a legitimate nonpunitive
governmental objective., 75 However, despite the change in the term of
76confinement from two years to an indeterminate term, the SVPA still provides
that a person will only remain committed for as long as he or she is found to
present a danger to others and is likely to commit a sexually violent crime upon
64. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6605(b) (amended by Cal. Proposition 83 § 29 (2006)).
65. Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 586-87.
66. Id. at 586, 591.
67. Id. at 591.
68. Id. at 592. Paraphilia was described as "recurrent and intense sexual fantasies and behaviors
involving the humiliation and forcible sexual penetration of persons against their will." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 605.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 607 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1997)).
74. Id. at 608.
75. Id. at 607 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363).
76. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (amended by Cal. Proposition 83 § 27 (2006)).
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release. 7 In other words, the duration of commitment is still intended "to hold the
person until his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to
others.,7' Hubbart's reasoning that the SVPA is not punitive still applies, despite
the more stringent standards of commitment created by Jessica's Law.
Moreover, courts are highly deferential to legislative statements of intent,
especially if they suggest that a statutory scheme is not "penal in nature., 79 For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court maintains that it "will reject the legislature's
manifest intent only where a party challenging the statute provides 'the clearest
proof' that 'the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate [the State's] intention' to deem it 'civil."'' 5
Furthermore, statements in the legislative history and in the California
Welfare and Institutions Code provide that the purpose of the SVPA was to
confine and treat sexually violent predators, not to punish them.' In fact, the
placement of the SVPA within the California Welfare and Institutions Code,
which focuses on "the care and treatment of various mentally ill and disabled
groups," emphasizes that sexually violent predators ought to be treated as
mentally ill and/or disabled persons in need of care and treatment." 82 Therefore,
because the courts usually defer to legislative intent in determining the purpose
of a law for an ex post facto analysis, a challenge to the SVPA on this basis is
also likely to fail because the clearly stated legislative intent and purpose for the
SVPA are not punitive.
B. Substantive Due Process Concerns
The U.S. Constitution protects citizens from deprivations of liberty without
due process of law.83 This protection includes "a substantive component that bars
certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.'"4 A strict scrutiny analysis is employed if a
court deems that a "fundamental" individual right is at issue.85 The government
77. Id. § 6605(b) (amended by Cal. Proposition 83 § 29 (2006)).
78. Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 607 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363-64).
79. See id. at 605-06 ("Courts should 'ordinarily defer' to statements in the legislative record indicating
that a measure is not penal in nature." (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361)).
80. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (alteration in original).
81. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6250 (West Supp. 2007) (stating the SVPA is not intended to
alter or interfere with the Penal Code and clarifying that sexually violent predators are to be treated "not as
criminals, but as sick persons"); SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 2 (Sept. 12, 1995)
(stating the intent that sexually violent criminals be "'confined and treated').
82. See Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 606 (stating that the placement of the SVPA within the Welfare and
Institutions Code was consistent with statements of legislative intent because the statute was "surrounded on
each side by other schemes concerned with the care and treatment of various mentally ill and disabled groups").
83. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
84. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125
(1990)).
85. Id. at 115 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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may only infringe on a fundamental right if the means of accomplishing the goal
are "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
'8 6
Historically, freedom from bodily restraint has been considered a
87fundamental liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause. Thus, to
survive strict scrutiny, the involuntary commitment of sexually violent predators
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
s8
Although the SVPA has withstood past constitutional challenges on
substantive due process grounds, 9 Jessica's Law amendments to the SVPA may
lead to renewed challenges. Jessica's Law makes it more difficult for sexually
violent predators to petition for less restrictive alternatives to commitment 9° and
imposes an indefinite commitment period.9' For these reasons, some may argue
that the SVPA is no longer narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Prior to the enactment of Jessica's Law, the California Supreme Court,
applying strict scrutiny analysis, held that the SVPA did not violate the
substantive due process rights of sexually violent predators. 92 The court held that
the state had a compelling interest in protecting the public from and providing
treatment for sexually violent predators.93 Since the state's interest after Jessica's
law is presumably no less compelling, the dispositive question remaining is
whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest.
Before Jessica's Law, the California Supreme Court found that the SVPA
was narrowly tailored because the SVPA targeted a limited group and required
specific conditions to be met before commitment could be imposed. 94 One
86. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
87. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977) ("[Tlhe contours of this historic liberty
interest .. .always have been thought to encompass freedom from bodily restraint and punishment. It is
fundamental that the state cannot hold and physically punish an individual except in accordance with due
process of law." (citation omitted)).
88. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (stating that involuntary commitment does not
extinguish the liberty interest in freedom from bodily restraint).
89. See, e.g., Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 593 (Cal. 1999).
90. See Cal. Proposition 83 § 29 (2006) (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6605(b)) (stating that a
committed person shall now be authorized to petition for a less restrictive alternative only upon various
determinations of the Director of the Department of Mental Health, rather than being allowed to automatically
file such a petition, as was provided in the former version of the SVPA).
91. See Cal. Proposition 83 § 27 (2006) (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604) (changing the
term of commitment from two years to an indefinite term).
92. Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 593.
93. Id. at 593 n.20 ("[T]he state interests-protection of the public and mental health treatment-are
compelling.").
94. Id.
The SVPA is narrowly focused on a select group of violent criminal offenders who commit
particular forms of predatory sex acts . . . and who are incarcerated at the time commitment
proceedings begin. Commitment as an SVP cannot occur unless it is proven, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the person currently suffers from a clinically diagnosed mental disorder, is dangerous and
likely to continue committing such crimes if released into the community, and has been found to
have sexually victimized at least two people in prior criminal proceedings.
Id.
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condition required a prior conviction of a violent sexual offense against at least
two people.9' However, after Jessica's Law, a prior conviction of a single violent
sexual offence is sufficient.96
Although Jessica's Law increases the number of people that will be classified
as sexually violent predators, this change is unlikely to violate due process. Even
though Jessica's Law broadened the sexually violent predator definition, the
SVPA is still "narrowly focused on a select group of violent criminal offenders
who commit particular forms of predatory sex acts." 97 Moreover, Jessica's Law
did not alter the remaining conditions that were critical to the California Supreme
Court's analysis upholding the SVPA. 9s Because the SVPA after Jessica's Law
still only applies to a particular group of offenders and because the specific
conditions on imposing civil commitment remain, the SVPA would probably
withstand a challenge in California courts on substantive due process grounds.
The U.S. Supreme Court has been more deferential to the legislature than the
California Supreme Court in reviewing "involuntary civil commitment laws
challenged under federal Constitutional grounds."99 The U.S. Supreme Court has
emphasized that legislators are the appropriate parties to "defin[e] terms of a
medical nature that have legal significance."'0° As a result, the Court has not
required any specific definition of a sexually violent predator for civil
commitment to be constitutionally sound.' °' Thus, involuntary civil commitment
will likely survive a federal substantive due process challenge so long as the
statute requires more than a mere finding of dangerousness, such as when the
commitment is limited to "those who suffer from a volitional impairment
rendering them dangerous beyond their control."' '° Even more broadly, the Court
has held "that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited subclass of
dangerous persons is [not] contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty."'103
95. Id.
96. Cal. Proposition 83 § 24 (2006) (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1)).
97. Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 593 n.20.
98. See id. ("Commitment as an SVP cannot occur unless it is proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the person currently suffers from a clinically diagnosed mental disorder, is dangerous and likely to continue
committing such crimes if released into the community, and has been found to have sexually victimized at least
two people in prior criminal proceedings."). Of the conditions listed, Jessica's Law changed only the condition
regarding the number of victims. See Cal. Proposition 83 § 24 (2006) (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 6600(a)(1)) (requiring only that the person be convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more
victims).
99. See Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 593 n.20 (pointing out that, contrary to the California Supreme Court, the
U.S. Supreme Court "accord[s] substantial deference to involuntary civil commitment laws challenged under
the federal Constitution").
100. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997).
101. See id. ("[W]e have never required state legislatures to adopt any particular nomenclature in
drafting civil commitment statutes.").
102. Id. at 358; see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975) (holding that the state's
confinement of "the harmless mentally ill" is unconstitutional).
103. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
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The fact that Jessica's Law allows for indefinite civil commitment, removes
the automatic annual right to petition for a less restrictive alternative, and
classifies a person as a sexually violent predator if he or she has victimized one
or more victims does not change the constitutional soundness of the SVPA. The
SVPA is properly applied to "a limited subclass of dangerous persons; '' '°" thus, it
should still be found constitutionally sound.
Similarly, although the California Supreme Court subjects the involuntary
civil commitment statutes "to the most rigorous form of constitutional review, ' 'I05
the U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely to find that the SVPA violates substantive
due process rights because it continues to provide a narrowly tailored solution to
a compelling state concern.
C. Double Jeopardy Concerns
The U.S. Constitution protects individuals from being tried or punished for the
same offense twice.'0 Because the SVPA provides for the confinement of sexually
violent predators after the completion of their sentence, the SVPA has been
challenged on the theory that it is placing a person in jeopardy twice for the same
offense." 7 Because Jessica's Law allows for an indeterminate term of commitment' s
and removes the automatic right to petition annually for a less restrictive
alternative,' °9 there may be renewed challenges to the SVPA on the basis that it now
more closely resembles punishment and, thus, places individuals in jeopardy twice
for the same offense.
Despite the more stringent standards imposed by Jessica's Law, this Comment
argues that the SVPA still does not violate the principles of double jeopardy. While a
person is found to be a sexually violent predator based largely on his or her prior
convictions,"° a person is not civilly committed because of those prior convictions."'
Rather, a sexually violent predator is committed because he or she has a "mental
disorder" that makes it likely he or she will continue to engage in sexually violent
criminal behavior, which makes that person dangerous to society.' '2 Past criminal
behavior is only used for evidentiary purposes in determining whether a person is a
104. See id.
105. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 593 n.20 (Cal. 1999).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.").
107. See, e.g., Ex parte Keddy, 233 P.2d 159, 161 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (addressing the
petitioner's argument that the statute allowing for civil commitment of sexual psychopaths constituted a
violation of the prohibition against punishing people twice for the same offense).
108. Cal. Proposition 83 § 27 (2006) (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604).
109. Cal. Proposition 83 § 29 (2006) (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6605(b)).
110. See id. § 6600 (West Supp. 2007) (defining "'sexually violent predator"' largely on the basis of
convictions for past sexually violent crimes).
11. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (emphasizing that a sexually violent predator is civilly
committed because he or she has a diagnosed mental disorder).
112. Id.
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sexually violent predator; it is not used as the sole ground for civil commitment."3
Thus, a sexually violent predator is not civilly committed for past crimes. Rather,
past crimes are evidence of a person's mental disorder."l4 While this may seem like a
matter of semantics to some, the California Supreme Court has used this reasoning to
defeat double jeopardy challenges to the SVPA. "5 Thus, it is likely that the California
Supreme Court will not construe the SVPA's civil commitment as punishment, even
under the more stringent terms added by Jessica's Law."
In sum, the SVPA after Jessica's Law will likely withstand constitutional
challenges. Jessica's Law, however, still leaves open a loophole that allows the
release of untreated sexually violent predators. ' 6 For that reason, alternate solutions
need to be explored that will close the loophole altogether.
Ill. THE LOOPHOLE IN CALIFORNIA'S SVPA REMAINS
California originally enacted the SVPA to "confine[] and treat[]" sexually
violent predators. ' 7 In contrast, the stated legislative intent of Jessica's Law was to
better protect society from sexual offenders."' Thus, the modified intent of
California's SVPA, as amended by Jessica's Law, is to treat sexually violent
predators and, at the same time, to protect society from persons who pose a threat."9
Unfortunately, while Jessica's Law may have narrowed the number of sexually
violent predators that slip back into society untreated, the loophole remains open;
some sexually violent predators are still released into society without receiving
treatment.'
A. The Legislative Intent Behind California's SVPA
The broad purpose of the SVPA is to protect unsuspecting communities from
individuals who are likely to commit sexually violent acts upon their release from
113. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 596 (Cal. 1999) ("[P]ast criminal conduct serve[s] an
important evidentiary function in establishing the dangerous mental impairments of sex offenders... .
114. Id.
115. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997).
116. See infra Part Il.
117. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 2 (Sept. 12, 1995) (stating the legislative
intent that sexually violent criminals be "confined and treated"); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6250 (West Supp.
2007) (stating that sexually violent predators "shall be treated, not as criminals, but as sick persons").
118. See generally Cal. Proposition 83 (2006) (amending various sections of the California Welfare and
Institute Code and the California Penal Code and stating that the intent of Jessica's Law, which amended the
SVPA, was to better protect society from sex offenders).
119. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 2 (Sept. 12, 1995) ("It is the intent of the
Legislature that once identified, these individuals, if found to be likely to commit acts of sexually violent
criminal behavior beyond a reasonable doubt, be confined and treated until such time that it can be determined
that they no longer present a threat to society.").
120. See supra Part I (describing the loophole).
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incarceration."2 To prevent such societal harm, the SVPA established civil
commitment procedures to treat and confine sexually violent predators.'
One central purpose of the SVPA is to "provide for continued incarceration
of some sex offenders after completion of their determinate prison sentences.
123
However, the continued incarceration of sexually violent predators is not meant
to punish but rather to protect society.14 The SVPA specifically provides that
sexually violent predators will only be confined as long as they pose a danger to
others and are likely to commit a sexually violent crime if released.' 25 If this
condition changes, the person will no longer be considered a sexually violent
predator and will be unconditionally released.'
26
The other primary purpose of California's SVPA is to treat sexually violent
predators.27 The legislative record is clear that the intent behind the SVPA is that
sexually violent predators should receive treatment for their mental disorders for
"as long as the disorders persist.' 28 In fact, California courts have interpreted the
intent of the SVPA as keeping sexually violent predators institutionalized until
"cured" of their disorders.' 29 Thus, sexually violent predators are meant to be
treated, "not as criminals, but as sick persons."'3
The dual purpose behind the SVPA is to both confine and treat sexually
violent predators until they no longer pose a threat to society, as evidenced by
legislative history, California case law, and even the SVPA itself.' However,
121. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 2 (Sept. 12, 1995) (stating that because
sexually violent predators are likely to engage in further acts of violence, they should be confined and treated
until they are no longer a threat to society).
122. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 5-6 (Sept. 15, 1995) (explaining that
the SVPA "establishes civil commitment procedures for the placement and treatment of sexually violent
offenders in a secure mental health facility following their release from prison").
123. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 2 (Sept. 12, 1995).
124. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 606 (Cal. 1999) (stating that "the Legislature
disavowed any 'punitive purpose' of the SVPA (alternation omitted)); see also SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 2 (Sept. 12, 1995) (stating that sexually violent predators should be "confined and
treated" until they are no longer a threat to society).
125. See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6605(b) (West Supp. 2007) (establishing procedures for
the release of a person whose condition has changed such that the person "no longer meets the definition of a
sexually violent predator").
126. See id. § 6605(f) ("If the superior court determines that the person is no longer a sexually violent
predator, he or she shall be unconditionally released and unconditionally discharged.").
127. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 2 (Sept. 12, 1995) (stating the legislative
intent that sexually violent criminals be "confined and treated"); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6250 (West Supp.
2007) (stating that sexually violent predators "shall be treated, not as criminals, but as sick persons").
128. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMIFrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 3 (Sept. 12, 1995) (stating that the intent
of the Legislature is for sexually violent predators to receive treatment for their disorders "only as long as the
disorders persist").
129. See, e.g., Ex parte Keddy, 233 P.2d 159, 164 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (stating that a sexually
violent predator "is an unfortunate person and until cured is not fit to mingle in society and should be
institutionalized until it is safe both for him and for society that he be released").
130. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6250 (West Supp. 2007).
131. See, e.g., SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 2 (Sept. 12, 1995) (stating the
intent to "confine and treat" sexually violent predators until they are no longer a threat to society).
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over time it became clear that this intent was not being effectuated by the
SVPA,132 and Jessica's Law was passed, at least partially in an attempt to bring
the SVPA closer to complying with its legislative intent. 33
B. SVPA Currently Violates Legislative Intent
Jessica's Law includes provisions that protect society from released sex
offenders,14 but its amendments to the SVPA do little to further the legislative
intent of treating and confining these predators. Even with the Jessica's Law
amendments, the SVPA still contains a loophole that not only allows sex
offenders to refuse treatment but also allows them to be released without
receiving treatment.
California's SVPA allows sexually violent predators to refuse to undergo
treatment for their diagnosed disorders, 33 despite the clear legislative intent to
treat them "not as criminals, but as sick persons."'' 36 As noted earlier, when an
incarcerated person is labeled as a sexually violent predator, that person will be
civilly committed to a mental health facility for an indeterminate period.'3 7 Upon
arriving at the mental health facility, the inmate will be offered treatment.' 38 If the
inmate refuses treatment, treatment is continually offered on a monthly basis.'3 9
This process could continue indefinitely, with the person never receiving
treatment.'°
The result of optional treatment is that sexually violent predators may be
released from civil commitment without receiving treatment for their condition.14
In fact, under the current SVPA, sexually violent predators can be released
without recognizing that they have a mental disorder.'4 2 Jessica's Law seemingly
makes it more difficult for sexually violent predators to be released because it
132. See supra Part I.
133. See Cal. Proposition 83 § 2(h) (2006) (stating the intent to strengthen and improve the laws that
provide for "commitment and control of sexually violent predators").
134. See generally Cal. Proposition 83 (2006) (amending various sections of the Penal Code to provide
for GPS tracking of certain released sex offenders and increasing the geographic limitations on where registered
sex offenders may reside, among other things).
135. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606(a) (West Supp. 2007) (explaining that those who decline
treatment will continue to be offered the opportunity for treatment on a monthly basis).
136. Id. § 6250.
137. Id. § 6604.
138. See id. § 6606(a) (stating that the CDMH will treat a person who is committed as a sexually violent
predator for his or her mental disorder).
139. Id.; see also id. § 6606(e) (stating that CDMH professionals will meet with those who refuse
treatment at monthly "treatment planning conferences").
140. See generally id. § 6606(b) (stating that a sexually violent predator does not have to be amenable to
treatment or even admit they have a problem during the time of commitment).
141. See generally id. § 6605 (West Supp. 2007) (describing the process of petitioning for the release of
the sexually violent predator, with no mention of a treatment requirement).
142. See id. § 6606(b) (stating that a sexually violent predator does not have to admit they have a
problem during the time of commitment).
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appears they are only allowed to petition for release if authorized to do so by the
Director of CDMH, as opposed to the automatic annual hearings formerly
required by the SVPA.' 3 However, this is qualified by another provision that
states that the SVPA does not remove a sexually violent predator's right to
petition the court for release without authorization from the Director of the
CDMH.'" Thus the loophole remains; sexually violent predators may still be
released into "unsuspecting communities"''4  without being treated for their
diagnosed mental disorders.
In sum, even after the Jessica's Law amendments, sexually violent predators
who are committed to mental health facilities under the SVPA may be released
back into society without undergoing treatment. This result frustrates the SVPA's
dual legislative purpose to both confine and treat sexually violent predators to
better protect society.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE
Although Jessica's Law tightens the loophole in the SVPA, there is still
enough room for sexually violent predators to slip back into society untreated.
Because Jessica's Law only recently passed, we do not know if sexually violent
predators are slipping through that loophole. However, a better system would
close the loophole altogether and make it impossible for sexually violent
predators to be released into society without undergoing treatment-as intended
by the Legislature.' 46 Whether by creating a new outpatient civil commitment
program similar to the one program currently used in Texas or by statutorily
requiring treatment before release, the loophole in California's SVPA must be
closed.
143. Compare id. § 6605(b) (West Supp. 2006) ("The director [of the Department of Mental Health]
shall provide the committed person with an annual written notice of his or her right to petition the court for
conditional release under Section 6608 .... If the person does not affirmatively waive his or her right to petition
the court for conditional release, the court shall set a show cause hearing to determine whether facts exist that
warrant a hearing ...."), with id. § 6605(b) (West Supp. 2007) (amended by Cal. Proposition 83 § 29 (2006))
("If the Department of Mental Health determines that either: (1) the person's condition has so changed that the
person no longer meets the definition of a sexually violent predator, or (2) conditional release to a less
restrictive alternative is in the best interest of the person and conditions can be imposed that adequately protect
the community, the director shall authorize the person to petition the court for conditional release ... or for an
unconditional discharge.").
144. Cal. Proposition 83 § 30 (2006) (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6608(a)).
145. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrIr-EE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 5-6 (Sept. 15, 1995) (explaining the
need to create a procedure that will prevent the release of sexually violent predators into "unsuspecting
communities").
146. See supra Part II.A (discussing the legislative intent that sexually violent predators undergo
treatment).
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A. An Outpatient Civil Commitment Requiring Treatment
The loophole could be closed by drastically changing the form of a sexually
violent predator's civil commitment. A program that releases sexually violent
predators back into society under intense monitoring 47 and simultaneously
requires the committed individuals to undergo treatment removes the possibility
of their release back into the community without treatment.' 48 Such a program
would shift the emphasis from confinement to rehabilitation and treatment and
would operate on a "philosophy that rehabilitation of even the most heinous
offenders is possible."'
49
In 1999, Texas established the first and only outpatient civil commitment
program for sexually violent predators in the United States.'5 The Outpatient
Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program was enacted due to fiscal
constraints, '5' as well as legislative findings that inpatient civil commitment
programs inadequately addressed the risk of recidivism posed by sexually violent
predators.'52 "The intent of the [amended Texas Sexually Violent Predator Act] is
to provide intensive outpatient rehabilitation and treatment to all sexually violent
predators."'53 As such, the Texas SVPA requires "participation in and compliance
with a specific course of treatment."''5 4 Failure to participate in treatment is "a
felony in the third degree," resulting in criminal penalties.'55
147. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.082(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007) (describing the
conditions of Texas's Outpatient Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program, which, among other things,
requires a judge's authorization before changing residence and submission to tracking with tracking equipment,
and "to any other appropriate supervision").
148. California currently provides outpatient treatment for sexually violent predators who are granted
conditional release from their civil commitment. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6609.1 (West Supp. 2007).
This is different from the program suggested in this section, which provides outpatient treatment as the only
form of civil commitment.
149. Tex. Dep't of State Health Servs., Council on Sex Offender Treatment, Civil Commitment of the
Sexually Violent Predator - History of Civil SVP Act, July 7, 2005, http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/csot/
csot cctxhist.shtm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
150. Tex. Dep't of State Health Servs., Council on Sex Offender Treatment, Treatment of Sex Offenders
- Sexually Violent Predators, July 7, 2005, http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/csot/csot-tsvp.shtm [hereinafter
Treatment of Sex Offenders] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
151. Id. ("The Outpatient Program was chosen strictly due to fiscal constraints.").
152. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001 (Vernon 2007) ("[E]xisting involuntary
commitment provisions . . . are inadequate to address the risk of repeated predatory behavior that sexually
violent predators pose to society.").
153. Treatment of Sex Offenders, supra note 150.
154. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.082(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2007).
155. See id. § 841.085 (Vernon 2007) ("A person commits an offense if the person violates a
requirement imposed under Section 841.082. An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree."); see
also Treatment of Sex Offenders, supra note 150 ("[F]ail[ing] to comply with the order of commitment... may
result in incarceration.").
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Under the Texas SVPA, a person classified as a sexually violent predator'5 6 is
committed to outpatient treatment '17 under supervision "coordinated by a case
manager."'5 8 The treatment and supervision begins immediately upon release
from a correctional facility or state hospital and continues "until the person's
behavioral abnormality has changed to the extent that the person is no longer
likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence."' 5 9 The sexually violent
predator is also subject to any requirements that may be deemed necessary to
ensure "compliance with treatment and supervision and to protect the
community," such as residential housing requirements, global positioning
satellite tracking, restricted transportation, and substance abuse testing.60
People may be concerned that outpatient sexually violent predator treatment
programs, like the one established in Texas, leave communities vulnerable to
dangerous sexual predators. Quite surprisingly, the Texas SVPA outpatient
program may advance public safety more than the inpatient programs.' 6' This is
because the outpatient programs, which mandate treatment, are arguably more
effective in rehabilitating sexually violent predators than inpatient programs.'
62
According to the Council on Sex Offender Treatment (a division of the Texas
Department of State Health Services), "[t]he success rate for offenders treated in
an inpatient setting is about half of that for offenders treated in an outpatient
setting.' 63  A likely explanation for this discrepancy is that the inpatient
programs, like the one in California, allow sexually violent predators to refuse
156. The process under the Texas SVPA for assessing whether a person is a sexually violent predator is
similar to the procedure under California's SVPA. For example, under both acts, the state assesses the
individual and only "the most predatory" go on to trial for civil commitment. See generally Tex. Dep't of State
Health Servs., Council on Sex Offender Treatment, Civil Commitment of the Sexually Violent Predator-
Inpatient vs. Outpatient SVP Civil Commitment, July 7, 2005, http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/csot/csot
ccinout.shtm [hereinafter Civil Commitment of the Sexually Violent Predator] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (describing the similarities between Texas's SVPA and other states' SVPA that require inpatient
commitment).
157. As part of the required treatment, sexually violent predators "attend group therapy two (2) times per
week and have two (2) individual sessions per month." Treatment of Sex Offenders, supra note 150. They are
also required to take polygraph tests regarding, among other things, the offense for which they were committed
and their sexual history. Id. In addition, penile plethysmographs are also used to assess sexual arousal and
"[s]elf-help, drug intervention, or time-limited treatment is used only as adjuncts to more comprehensive
treatment." Id. "Intensive sex offender treatment" in some instances may also include family therapy sessions.
Id.
158. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.081 (Vernon Supp. 2007).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 841.082(a); see also Treatment of Sex Offenders, supra note 150 (listing treatment and
supervision requirements of the Outpatient Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program to be administrated by
the Council on Sex Offender Treatment).
161. See Civil Commitment of the Sexually Violent Predator, supra note 156 ("[T]o date the Texas
outpatient program has shown the most success in the treatment of SVPs while maintaining the highest level of
community safety.").
162. See id. ("[T]o date the Texas outpatient program has shown the most success in the treatment of
SVPs while maintaining the highest level of community safety.").
163. Id.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 39
treatment,'" whereas the Texas outpatient program makes treatment mandatory
for all sexually violent predators.' 65 Because sex offenders generally need long-
term treatment, allowing sexually violent predators to refuse treatment is
detrimental to long-term community safety.'66
Another reason for the higher rate of success in outpatient treatment
programs is that such programs require sexually violent predators to develop
internal controls to stop themselves from re-offending. 67 Because inpatient
programs protect sexually violent predators from the stresses of life outside of
incarceration, "the availability of alcohol or drugs, and the inadvertent contact
with potential victims," these predators are less likely to develop the ability to
"identify[] triggers and deviant behaviors," and to stop themselves prior to acting
on their impulses.1
61
Sexually violent predators released from inpatient treatment programs are left
to struggle largely alone outside of confinement.' 69 By contrast, an outpatient
program allows offenders to work through their struggles while still undergoing
treatment and supervision. '7 The result is that society is better protected by a
mandatory outpatient program than a voluntary inpatient program.
The implementation of an outpatient program in California would seemingly
ignore one prong of the dual intent behind California's SVPA-protecting
society by confining sexually violent predators."' However, the overarching
purpose of California's SVPA is to protect society from sexually violent
predators' until such predators are no longer a threat. 73 Evidence suggests that
outpatient programs that mandate treatment would better protect society than an
inpatient program that allows for refusal of treatment, such as the current
program in California. For example, "[s]ince the inception of the Texas program,
none of the sexually violent predators released in Texas communities have been
charged or convicted of a new sexually violent offense. ' 7
164. See id. (stating that eighty percent of California's sexually violent predators refuse treatment,
seventy-five percent in Wisconsin refuse treatment, and seventy percent in Florida refuse treatment).
165. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.082(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
166. See Civil Commitment of the Sexually Violent Predator, supra note 156 ("Use of an outpatient
program, in which treatment is mandated in Texas, can potentially provide for more long-term community
safety than inpatient programs.").
167. See id. (stating that because inpatient programs rely on external controls such as locked facilities,
sexually violent predators do not develop internal controls).
168. See id. (describing impediments to the development of internal controls in inpatient programs).
169. See id. (describing impediments to the development of internal controls in inpatient programs).
170. Id.
171. See supra Part III (discussing the dual legislative intent for confining and treating sexually violent
predators under California's SVPA).
172. See generally Cal. Proposition 83 (2006) (stating that the intent of Jessica's Law, which amended
the SVPA, is to better protect society from sex offenders).
173. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 2 (Sept. 12, 1995) (emphasizing the
threat that sexually violent predators pose to society and the intent to confine them only so long as they continue
to pose such a threat).
174. Tex. Dep't of State Health Servs., Council on Sex Offender Treatment, Civil Commitment of the
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Thus, because an outpatient program that mandates treatment is actually
more effective in protecting society than an inpatient program, such a program
would better fulfill the legislative intent of California's SVPA.' s At the same
time, such a program would also effectively close the loophole by preventing the
release of sexually violent predators who have not undergone treatment.
B. Requiring Treatment Before Release from Civil Commitment
A less drastic approach to closing the loophole that would also satisfy the
legislative intent of confining and treating sexually violent predators would be to
require that a person participate in treatment before being released from civil
commitment. Currently, California's SVPA allows sexually violent predators to
petition for release from their civil commitment either with or without the
authorization of the Director of Mental Health.' 76 Further, there is no requirement
that a sexually violent predator undergo treatment during civil commitment. 77 As
a result, sexually violent predators may be released into society without obtaining
any treatment for their diagnosed mental disorders.
7 8
Requiring that sexually violent predators receive treatment may seem like an
obvious method of closing the loophole, but it also raises several concerns. For
example, requiring an individual to undergo psychological treatment is arguably
an invasion of the constitutional right to privacy and personal autonomy.' 79 In
Sexually Violent Predator-Conclusion, July 7, 2005, http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/csot/csotcconclc.shtm (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review). Unfortunately, California does not track the recidivism of sexually violent
offenders released from civil commitment under the SVPA. See Tex. Dep't of State Health Servs., Council on
Sex Offender Treatment, State by State SVP Act Comparison, July 2005, http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/csot/csot-
compar.shtm [hereinafter State by State Comparison] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
175. In addition, Texas's Outpatient Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program is more cost-
effective than California's current inpatient program. State by State Comparison, supra note 174. California's
projected total annual program cost in 2004 was $45.5 million, while Texas's projected total annual program
cost the same year was $490,000. Id. At the same time, California's program applied to 486 individuals, while
Texas' program applied to only forty-one individuals. Id.
176. See Cal. Proposition 83 § 29 (2006) (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6605(b)) (allowing a
sexually violent predator to petition for release upon authorization from the Director of the Department of
Mental Health); see also Cal. Proposition 83 § 30 (2006) (amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6608(a))
(clarifying that sexually violent predators have the right to petition for release even without express
authorization from the Director of the Department of Mental Health).
177. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606(a) (West Supp. 2007) (stating that sexually violent predators
who decline treatment will continue to have treatment offered to them).
178. See supra Part I1I.B (describing the loophole in California's SVPA that ultimately allows the
release of sexually violent predators into society without treatment).
179. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 145, 148-49 (Minn. 1988) (stating that there is a
protected privacy interest in the individual's right to choose to refrain from taking neuroleptic drugs); Price v.
Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 910-11 (Minn. 1976) (discussing the plaintiff's claim that his right of privacy was
violated by being required to undergo electroshock therapy while involuntarily committed to a state mental
health facility).
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addition, there is debate, particularly among mental health professionals, as to
whether required, involuntary treatment would be effective.
80
1. Requiring Treatment Would Not Violate Sexually Violent Predators'
Constitutional Rights
The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed concern that institutionalized mental
health patients are often subjected to intrusive medical treatment that may violate
their "right to bodily integrity."' 8 ' Individuals who are involuntarily committed to
mental health facilities retain the constitutional right to refuse unwanted
medication.'82 However, lower courts have made it clear that the right to be free
from bodily intrusion is far from absolute.'83 Personal "autonomy must yield to
the legitimate government interests that are incidental to the basis for legal
institutionalization."'8 4 Thus, the civilly committed individual is protected only
against "arbitrary and capricious" government actions.'85
To determine whether an individual's right to privacy should yield to
legitimate governmental interests, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that
there must be a proceeding in which the court determines "the necessity and
reasonableness of the prescribed treatment.'8, 6 To make that determination, "the
patient's need for the treatment [should be balanced] against the intrusiveness of
the prescribed treatment.' 87 According to the court, such a proceeding should be
required for the most intrusive forms of treatment, such as psychosurgery or
electroshock therapy.'88 However, such a proceeding would not be required for
180. See generally Karen J. Terry & Edward W. Mitchell, Motivation and Sex Offender Treatment
Efficacy: Leading a Horse to Water and Making It Drink?, 45 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOGY 663 (2001) (discussing the debate regarding the efficacy of treatment for sex offenders).
181. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 626 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (discussing the possibility that treatment administered while committed to a mental facility may violate an
individual's "right to bodily integrity").
182. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 n.16 (1982) (assuming for purposes of the discussion that
"involuntarily committed mental patients retain liberty interests protected directly by the Constitution ... and
that these interests are implicated by the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs" (citation omitted)).
183. See United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that individuals who are
legally confined retain significant interests, but those interests are not absolute).
184. Id.
185. Id. (stating that the interests retained by involuntarily committed individuals "are only afforded
protection against arbitrary and capricious government action").
186. Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 913 (Minn. 1976).
Factors which should be considered are (1) the extent and duration of changes in behavior patterns
and mental activity effected by the treatment, (2) the risks of adverse side effects, (3) the
experimental nature of the treatment, (4) its acceptance by the medical community of [the] state, (5)
the extent of intrusion into the patient's body and the pain connected with the treatment, and (6) the
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less intrusive treatments, such as the use of mild tranquilizers and therapies that
require the cooperation of the patient. 89
Though the Minnesota Supreme Court decision is certainly not mandatory
authority for California courts, other state and federal courts have cited its
decision.' 90 Furthermore, it is a helpful model to analyze whether requiring
participation in the treatment provided for civilly committed sexually violent
predators violates those individuals' right of privacy.
The CDMH runs the "Sex Offender Commitment Program" for sexually
violent predators to help participants gain the skills and behavior needed to
manage their deviant behavior and reduce their risk of recidivism.' 9 ' Components
of the program include "[c]ognitive behavioral and relapse prevention training,"
"[b]ehavioral reconditioning and pharmacological treatments," "[p]olygraph
examination and plethysmography,' ' 92 "[s]ubstance abuse treatment, vocational
training, and cultivation of prosocial behaviors and constructive use of leisure
time," and "[c]lose community treatment and surveillance upon discharge."' 93
Treatment consists of five phases: treatment readiness, skills acquisition, skills
application, discharge readiness, and community outpatient treatment.1
94
To determine whether the treatment offered by the CDMH is necessary and
reasonable, the Minnesota model suggests balancing "the patient's need for
treatment against the intrusiveness of the prescribed treatment."' 95 With regard to
189. Id.
190. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 626 n.3 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Price v. Sheppard as an example that convulsive therapy may violate the institutionalized patient's
"right to bodily integrity"); Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1048-51 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (citing Price in a
list of cases used to support the holding that "the decision to obtain or reject medical treatment ... is protected
by the right of privacy"); Oslund v. United States, 128 F.R.D. 110, 112 (D. Minn. 1989) (quoting Price for the
proposition that "'an intrusion into the right of privacy can only be justified by a legitimate and important state
interest, and even then the intrusion must be by the least intrusive means'); Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst.,
138 P.3d 238, 251-52 (Alaska 2006) (agreeing with Price that the judiciary should determine the
appropriateness of requiring certain medical treatments and specifically finding the procedure and factors of
consideration suggested by Price to be "sensible"); Steinkruger v. Miller, 612 N.W.2d 591, 600 (S.D. 2000)
(citing Price to support the holding that for treatment to be essential or necessary so as to prevent the individual
from being able to refuse treatment, there must not be alternative, less intrusive means available).
191. See Cal. Dep't of Mental Health, Coalinga State Hospital: Model Sex Offender Treatment, 2008,
http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/Services and Programs/StateHospitals/Coalingafrreatment.asp [hereinafter Coalinga
State Hospital] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("This multi-modal treatment program is designed to assist
participants in developing skills and behaviors for managing their deviant behavior and for reducing their risk of re-
offending.").
192. Plethysmography is a procedure used to measure the sexual arousal of sex offenders when faced
with certain stimuli. See generally Cal. Dep't of Mental Health, LTCS Best Practice Catalog Submission,
http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/Services-and-Programs/StateHospitals/Best-Practices/docs/l/1 C-5-031.pdf
(last visited Feb. 17, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the purpose and procedure
involved with plethysmography as part of the treatment for sexually violent predators).
193. Coalinga State Hospital, supra note 191.
194. See id. (describing each phase of treatment in detail). Sexually violent predators are returned to the
community after they have completed the fourth phase, and they then participate in the fifth phase of treatment
on an outpatient basis. Id.
195. Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 913 (Minn. 1976) (creating a judicial procedure for
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California's sexually violent predators, however, the Legislature has determined
that these institutionalized individuals have such an extreme need for treatment
that it is acceptable to commit them until they are no longer dangerous to
society. 96
Furthermore, the "Sex Offender Commitment Program" provided by the
CDMH is minimally intrusive. To begin with, it is difficult to distinguish the
more intrusive forms of treatment that require a determination of necessity and
reasonableness before they can be imposed upon an unwilling individual from
treatment that does not require such a determination.'97 However, the Minnesota
Supreme Court clarified that the use of mild tranquilizers and therapies requiring
patient cooperation does not require such a determination.'" The treatment
offered to sexually violent predators who are civilly committed under
California's SVPA primarily consists of therapy that does not require medication
or other intrusions into the individual's bodily integrity.'99 Thus, the treatment
would likely be found minimally intrusive.
As a result, because the psychological treatment of sexually violent predators
is considered necessary to justify their civil commitment after completion of their
penal sentence,2°° and since their treatment would not violate their right to bodily
integrity, requiring compliance with California's SVPA treatment program would
not likely violate their privacy rights.
2. Requiring Treatment Would Be Effective
Even assuming that it would be constitutional to require sexually violent
predators to obtain treatment, doubt remains in the minds of mental health
professionals as to whether mandated treatment would be effective.20' However,
determining whether an institutionalized individual's right of personal autonomy should yield to the state's
interest in requiring treatment).
196. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 604 (Cal. 1999) (noting that in order to be committed
under the SVPA, the individual must pose "a danger to the health and safety of others" and must be likely to
reoffend if released into the community; see also supra Part III.A (describing the legislative intent behind the
SVPA as requiring that sexually violent predators receive treatment).
197. See Price, 239 N.W.2d at 913 ("We cannot draw a clear line between the more intrusive forms of
treatment requiring this procedural hearing and those which do not.").
198. Id. ("Certainly this procedure is not intended to apply to the use of mild tranquilizers or those
therapies requiring the cooperation of the patient.").
199. See Coalinga State Hospital, supra note 191 (describing the treatment program offered to sexually
violent predators committed under California's SVPA).
200. See supra Part IlI.A (describing the legislative intent that sexually violent predators receive
treatment).
201. See generally Terry & Mitchell, supra note 180 (discussing the debate regarding the efficacy of
treatment for sex offenders).
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at least one study2°2 has demonstrated that there is little correlation between
success rates and the motivation for participating in treatment.20
3
This study examined whether the outcome of treatment for sex offenders
differed based on whether the offender voluntarily participated in treatment or
20
was indirectly coerced. Indirect coercion was defined as "the feeling that there
is no choice but to go into treatment because without the treatment there will be
adverse consequences., 20 5 An example of indirect coercion is where states only
release civil committed sexually violent predators when they are "no longer a
danger to the community," which usually requires that they be rehabilitated.2 °
Such programs do not make treatment a requirement but indirectly coerce
offenders to participate so that they may be seen as rehabilitated.' °7
The type of treatment examined in the study is similar to the treatment that is
offered to California's civilly committed sexually violent predators. 2 ' This makes
the study particularly relevant to determining whether adding a statutory
requirement of participation in treatment to California's SVPA would be prudent.
The study found no significant difference for successful completion2 9 of the
program between those who wanted to change their behavior and those who were
coerced (directly or indirectly) into participating in the treatment.2'0 Thus,
according to the study, "it is possible for sex offenders . . . to benefit from
cognitive-behavioral treatment programs," such as those offered under
California's SVPA, "even if there is no desire to participate.,
21 1
In sum, requiring that sexually violent predators obtain treatment effectuates
legislative intent and closes the loophole that allowed the release of untreated
sexually violent predators back into society.
202. Id. at 664-65 (conducting a study to determine whether a sex offender's motivation for participating
in treatment, i.e., coerced or voluntary, is relevant to the efficacy of the treatment).
203. Id. at 669-70.
204. Id. at 664-65.
205. Id. at 665 (citation omitted).
206. See id. at 664-65 (stating that many offenders who participate in treatment programs because they
expect to be released once they are rehabilitated are likely indirectly coerced into treatment).
207. Id.
208. Compare id. (describing the cognitive behavioral treatment examined by the study, which is aimed
at eliminating the distorted thought processes of sex offenders), with Coalinga State Hospital, supra note 191
(describing the treatment program offered to sexually violent predators committed under California's SVPA and
its focus on "managing their deviant behavior and for reducing their risk of re-offending").
209. "Efficacy is defined as the offenders' ability to recognize and eliminate at least four [cognitive
distortions] (over half) that were present at the outset of treatment and dichotomized into successful or
unsuccessful." Terry & Mitchell, supra note 180, at 665. Those offenders who were able to do that were
considered to have successfully completed treatment. Id.
210. Id. at 669 ("[An equal number of offenders ... who were and were not motivated to participate
successfully completed the program, and there is no significant difference between the two populations ...."),
211. Id. at 671 (stating that sex offenders can benefit from cognitive-behavioral treatment regardless of
their motivation to participate in treatment).
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V. CONCLUSION
Currently, approximately 2,700 sexually violent predators are civilly
committed in nineteen states.212 "Of the 250 offenders released unconditionally
since the first [sexually violent predator act] was passed in 1990, about half of
them were [released] on legal or technical grounds unrelated to treatment. 213
Clearly, many other states with sexually violent predator acts face problems
similar to the loophole in California's SVPA.24
Jessica's Law narrowed the loophole by making the procedure for release
from civil commitment more stringent. 2 5 Nevertheless, sexually violent predators
are still released without undergoing treatment. 2 6 As long as sexually violent
predators are released back into society without undergoing treatment, the
legislative intent of the SVPA will be frustrated.2 7 If the SVPA loophole is left
open, even as narrowed by Jessica's Law, sexually violent predators will be able
to slip through it and back into society without undergoing the treatment that has
been deemed to be so necessary as to justify their civil confinement.
For these reasons, whether by creating a new outpatient civil commitment
program similar to the Texas program or by statutorily requiring treatment before
release, California must close the loophole in its SVPA.
212. Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y.
TiMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at 1.
213. Id.
214. See id. ("Since [Kansas v. Hendricks], state officials, civil liberties advocates and lawyers have
wrestled with exactly what that treatment requirement means.").
215. See supra Part I (discussing how Jessica's Law amends the SVPA).
216. See supra Part III.B (discussing how the loophole remains open despite the amendments of the
SVPA).
217. See supra Part III.B (discussing how the SVPA frustrates legislative intent by allowing sexually
violent predators to be released without treatment).

